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This post presents analyses the violations of the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) ignored by those recognizing the State of Palestine.
The Oslo II Accords are predicated on the principle of mutual and reciprocal fulfillment of obligations. An examination of the historical record since 1995, when read against the text of the agreement, reveals several material breaches by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Authority (PA), and other Palestinian factions.
A. Failure to Prevent Terrorism and Hostile Acts
A systematic failure to uphold the obligation to prevent and combat terrorism and the refusal to utilize the agreement’s prescribed cooperative security mechanisms for this purpose.
Article XV(1) establishes an unambiguous duty: « Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other… and shall take legal measures against offenders ».
This obligation is operationalized through the security coordination mechanisms detailed in Annex I, such as the District Coordination Offices (DCOs), which are mandated to « deal with the prevention of friction and violence ».
The wave of terror attacks during the Second Intifada (2000-2005), perpetrated by factions including Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (a group affiliated with the PLO’s Fatah party), constitutes a primary breach of this core undertaking. The violation was compounded by the PA’s demonstrable failure to take the « measures necessary » to dismantle terrorist infrastructure. This inaction represents a failure to fulfill a foundational security commitment that underpins the entire phased withdrawal and transfer of power envisioned by the Accords.
B. Operation of Unauthorized Armed Forces
The establishment, maintenance, and operation of armed militias entirely separate from and outside the control of the single, authorized Palestinian Police force.
Article XIV(3) is unequivocal: « Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ». Article XIV(4) further prohibits any organization from possessing or importing firearms or weapons.
The existence and entrenchment of numerous armed groups is a flagrant violation of this provision. The 2007 violent takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas and its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, created a separate, hostile military authority. Furthermore, the continued operation of armed wings of other factions, including those affiliated with the PLO signatory itself (e.g., Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades), demonstrates a direct contravention of the commitment to a single, legitimate security authority under the PA, as stipulated by the agreement.
C. Amendment of the Palestinian National Covenant
The failure to formally and unambiguously complete the required amendments to the Palestinian National Covenant within the mandated timeframe.
Article XXXI(9) contains a specific, time-bound commitment: « The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration of the Council, the Palestinian National Council will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant… ».
This article mandated the removal of clauses calling for the destruction of Israel. While the Palestinian National Council (PNC) convened in 1996 and passed a general resolution, it failed to approve the specific textual changes required for a formal amendment. Subsequent attempts to declare the problematic articles null and void via letters did not satisfy the procedural requirement of formal approval by the PNC as stipulated in the Accord. This failure to fulfill a foundational, confidence-building measure eroded trust in the process from its early stages.
D. Unilateral Abrogation of the Negotiated Process
Taking unilateral steps in international forums to predetermine the outcome of permanent status issues, thereby circumventing the agreed-upon bilateral negotiation framework and its dispute resolution mechanisms.
Article XXXI(7) states, « Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations ». Article XXI establishes a specific ladder for dispute resolution: the Liaison Committee, conciliation, and mutually agreed-upon arbitration.
The PA’s diplomatic initiatives to gain recognition of statehood at the United Nations and its accession to international legal bodies like the International Criminal Court (ICC) to pursue claims against Israel constitute a unilateral effort to « change the status » of the territories. By seeking rulings from external judicial bodies, the PA has bypassed the exclusive dispute resolution mechanisms it agreed to in Article XXI. This strategy attempts to secure through international legal pressure what was contractually reserved for bilateral negotiation.