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We clarify point by point the lack of objectivity demonstrated by France and Saudi Arabia through their project.
1. We, Leaders and Representatives, gathered at the United Nations in New York on 28-30 July 2025, at a historically critical moment for peace, security, and stability in the Middle East.
2. We agreed to take collective action to end the war in Gaza, to achieve a just, peaceful and lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the effective implementation of the two-State solution, and to build a better future for Palestinians, Israelis and all peoples of the region.
The assertion that the two-state solution is the only means to achieve a just and lasting resolution is a political position and not a binding rule of international law. The Oslo I and II Accords (1993, 1995), signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, established a framework for final status negotiations, without imposing the two-state solution as the only option. International law, under Article 33 of the UN Charter, requires peaceful resolution of disputes through means freely chosen by the parties, such as negotiation, mediation, or arbitration. The jurisprudence of the UN Security Council, notably Resolution 242, calls for a peaceful settlement but leaves the determination of borders to direct negotiation. Furthermore, the viability of a sovereign Palestinian state depends on its ability to guarantee Israel’s security, a condition that has been constantly undermined by the actions of terrorist organizations.
3. Recent developments have highlighted, once again, and more than ever, the terrifying human toll and the grave implications for regional and international peace and security of the persistence of the Middle East conflict. Absent decisive measures towards the two-State solution and robust international guarantees, the conflict will deepen and regional peace will remain elusive.
This paragraph establishes a simplistic causality between the absence of a two-state solution and the persistence of the conflict. This assertion is contradicted by recent history. The failure of past peace agreements (such as at Camp David in 2000 or at Annapolis in 2007) is not solely due to the absence of « decisive measures, » but also to Palestinian leaders’ refusal to accept peace offers and the waves of violence that followed, notably the Second Intifada. Moreover, the Abraham Accords of 2020, signed by Israel with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, demonstrate that peace and regional cooperation can be established without the Israeli-Palestinian conflict being resolved. These agreements prove that the argument that this conflict is the « core » of regional instability is outdated.
4. We reiterated our condemnation of all attacks by any party against civilians, including all acts of terrorism and indiscriminate attacks, and all attacks against civilian objects, acts of provocation, incitement and destruction. We recall that the taking of hostages is prohibited under international law. We condemn the attacks committed by Hamas against civilians on the 7th of October. We also condemn the attacks by Israel against civilians in Gaza and civilian infrastructure, siege and starvation, which have resulted in a devastating humanitarian catastrophe and protection crisis. There is no justification for breaches in grave violation of international law, including international humanitarian law, and we stressed the need for accountability.
This paragraph establishes a false legal and moral equivalence between Hamas’ terrorist acts and Israel’s military operations. In international humanitarian law (IHL), there is a fundamental distinction between acts of terrorism, which are war crimes and crimes against humanity (by nature), and a state’s legitimate self-defense operations. The Hague Convention (1907) and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions require parties to the conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians. Israel strives to respect these principles by issuing warnings to civilians before strikes. In contrast, Hamas commits proven war crimes by intentionally using civilians as human shields and positioning its military infrastructure (tunnels, command centers) under schools, hospitals, and mosques. The Palmer Commission report (2011) judged Israel’s blockade of Gaza legal, as it was imposed for legitimate security reasons against terrorism and allows humanitarian aid to enter. Allegations of « famine » and « siege » are often contradicted by data on humanitarian aid entering Gaza.
5. War, occupation, terror and forced displacement cannot deliver either peace or security. Only a political solution can. The end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the implementation of the two-State solution are the only way to satisfy the legitimate aspirations, in accordance with international law, of both Israelis and Palestinians and the best way to end violence in all its forms and any destabilizing role of non-state actors, put an end to terrorism and violence in all its forms, guarantee the security of both peoples and the sovereignty of two states, and for peace, prosperity and regional integration to prevail to the benefit of all peoples in the region.
This paragraph is a political assertion that ignores one of the main obstacles to peace: the ideology of terrorist groups. Organizations like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah do not recognize Israel’s right to exist and have its destruction as their explicit objective. Under customary international law, every state has the right to take measures to protect its population. The legal systems of countries like the United States and Canada, through their national security jurisprudence, recognize the necessity of robust measures to counter terrorist threats. The idea that the two-state solution is « the only way » is a postulate that is not based on law.
6. We have thus committed to taking tangible, timebound, and irreversible steps for the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine and the implementation of the Two-State solution, to achieve, through concrete actions, as rapidly as possible, the realization of an independent, sovereign, economically viable and democratic State of Palestine living side by side, in peace and security with Israel, thus enabling full regional integration and mutual recognition.
The establishment of a Palestinian state is a political objective that must respect the criteria of international law. The Montevideo Convention (1933), which is considered the basis of international law on state recognition, stipulates that a state must have a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The political and territorial division between the West Bank (managed by the Palestinian Authority) and Gaza (managed by Hamas) makes Palestine non-viable as a single entity meeting these criteria.
7. We agreed to support that aim and within a timebound process the conclusion and implementation of a just and comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and Palestine, in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions, the Madrid terms of reference, including the principle of land for peace, and the Arab Peace Initiative, ending the occupation, resolving all outstanding and final status issues and ending all claims, achieving just, and lasting peace, and ensuring security for all and enabling full regional integration and mutual recognition in the Middle East, in full respect for the sovereignty of all States.
This paragraph refers to UN resolutions, notably Resolution 242, but omits to mention that this resolution calls for withdrawal « from territories » and not « from all territories » occupied, leaving the possibility of border modifications through negotiation to ensure Israel’s security. The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 is mentioned, but it was rejected by Israel due to its demands for total withdrawal and implementation of the « right of return » for refugees, conditions considered existential threats to the Jewish state. The Oslo Accords clearly stipulate that final status issues, including borders, territories, and Jerusalem’s status, must be resolved through bilateral negotiations.
8. The war in Gaza must end now. We expressed support for the efforts of Egypt, Qatar and the United States to immediately bring parties back to implementing the ceasefire agreement in all its phases leading to a permanent end to hostilities, the release of all hostages, the exchange of Palestinian prisoners, the return of all remains, and the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, and reiterated our determination to act for the achievement of these objectives. In this context, Hamas must free all hostages.
Israel’s right to self-defense is enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. A permanent ceasefire and total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza without the complete dismantling of Hamas’ military capability and the release of all hostages would constitute an existential threat to Israel’s national security. Israel’s operational priority is to ensure that an event like October 7, 2023, can never happen again. Demanding withdrawal without these conditions being met is interference in Israel’s sovereignty and its fundamental right to protect its citizens.
10. Gaza is an integral part of a Palestinian State and must be unified with the West Bank. There must be no occupation, siege, territorial reduction, or forced displacement.
This paragraph presents a political vision as reality. The division between Gaza and the West Bank is the result of Hamas’ 2007 coup, not Israeli action. The allegation of Gaza’s « occupation » is technically inaccurate since Israel’s 2005 withdrawal. The Gaza blockade was deemed legal by the UN’s Palmer Commission as it is justified by legitimate security imperatives. Allegations of « forced displacement » must be proven. Access control measures are necessary for security reasons to prevent the entry of weapons and terrorists.
11. Governance, law enforcement and security across all Palestinian territory must lie solely with the Palestinian Authority, with appropriate international support. We welcomed the « One State, One Government, One Law, One Gun » policy of the Palestinian Authority and pledged our support to its implementation including through the necessary DDR process that should be completed within an agreed mechanism with international partners and a set timeframe. In the context of ending the war in Gaza, Hamas must end its rule in Gaza and hand over its weapons to the Palestinian Authority, with international engagement and support, in line with the objective of a sovereign and independent Palestinian State.
This paragraph rests on an unrealistic premise. Hamas took control of Gaza through violence in 2007. The Palestinian Authority has neither the legitimacy nor the capacity to impose its authority over Hamas and other terrorist groups without massive international military assistance and forced disarmament of Hamas. The concept of « One State, One Government, One Law, One Gun » is an aspiration that cannot be achieved without radical change and complete disarmament of all terrorist groups, something Hamas categorically refuses to do.
12. We supported the urgent implementation of the Arab-OIC reconstruction plan to allow early recovery and reconstruction in the Gaza Strip, while ensuring that Palestinians remain in their land. We encouraged all States and regional and international partners in this regard to actively participate in the Gaza Recovery and Reconstruction Conference to be held soon in Cairo.
Gaza’s reconstruction has always been a challenge due to the systematic diversion of funds and materials by Hamas. UN reports and non-governmental organizations have documented how construction materials (cement, steel) have been used to build attack tunnels and rockets instead of civilian infrastructure. It is essential, under international law, that aid funds be monitored to ensure they are not used for military purposes, in accordance with international law of armed conflict and humanitarian assistance principles.
13. Following the ceasefire, a transitional administrative committee must be immediately established to operate in Gaza under the umbrella of the Palestinian Authority.
This proposal is a political solution that has no basis in international law. The legitimacy and capacity of the Palestinian Authority to impose its authority in Gaza are complex political questions. Without total disarmament of Hamas, such a committee would be powerless and ineffective.
14. We urged member States, the United Nations, its agencies, international organizations to provide resources and assistance at scale to support recovery and reconstruction, including through a dedicated reconstruction international Trust Fund to that aim. We underlined the indispensable role of UNRWA, and expressed our commitment to continue supporting, including through the appropriate funding, the agency in the implementation of its mandate and welcomed its commitment and ongoing efforts to implement the recommendations of the Colonna report. Upon the achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee issue to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, UNRWA will hand over its public-like services in the Palestinian territory to empowered and prepared Palestinian institutions.
Support for UNRWA is highly controversial. The agency is accused of perpetuating Palestinians’ refugee status, which is unique in international law. The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) mandate, which manages all other refugees, is to resettle or reintegrate them. Moreover, documented allegations involving UNRWA employees in the October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks have raised serious questions about its neutrality and effectiveness. Resolution 194 is a UN General Assembly resolution, which is not legally binding. The interpretation of this resolution as an unrestricted « right of return » is a political position that is not accepted by the international community and threatens Israel and its population.
15. We supported the deployment of a temporary international stabilization mission upon invitation by the Palestinian Authority and under the aegis of the United Nations and in line with UN principles, building on existing UN capacities, to be mandated by the UN Security Council, with appropriate regional and international support. We welcomed the readiness expressed by some Member States to contribute in troops.
The deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission requires the consent of all concerned parties, including Israel, under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which protects state sovereignty. Such a mission without Israel’s consent would be illegal. Moreover, the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions against non-state terrorist groups (like Hezbollah in Lebanon) has largely demonstrated their ineffectiveness.
16. This mission, which could evolve depending on the needs, would provide protection to the Palestinian civilian population, support transfer of internal security responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority, provide capacity building support for the Palestinian State and its security forces, and security guarantees for Palestine and Israel, including monitoring of the ceasefire and of a future peace agreement, in full respect of their sovereignty.
The concept of « security guarantees for Israel » by an international force is unrealistic if this force is unable to disarm terrorist groups. Such a mission could only provide credible security to Israel if it were endowed with a robust mandate and sufficient force to impose disarmament, which is politically improbable.
17. We committed to supporting the Palestinian government and Palestinian security forces, through funding program from regional and international partners, with appropriate training, equipment, vetting and advising, building on the experience of missions such as USSC, EUPOLCOPPS & EUBAM Rafah.
Support for Palestinian security forces is an area where the risk of diversion of funds and weapons is high. Vetting (background verification) of these forces is essential to avoid terrorist infiltration, but past efforts have shown this remains an unrealistic major challenge.
18. We also committed to supporting measures and programs combating radicalization, incitement, dehumanization, violent extremism conducive to terrorism, discrimination and hate speech across all platforms and actors, and promoting a culture of peace at school, in Israel and Palestine, and to support civil society engagement and dialogue. We welcomed the ongoing efforts to modernize the Palestinian curriculum and called upon Israel to undertake a similar effort. We supported setting up an international monitoring mechanism to verify both sides’ commitment to these objectives.
This paragraph establishes a false equivalence between the two parties. Reports from organizations like IMPACT-se (Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education) and analyses by the US State Department have systematically documented incitement to antisemitism, hatred, and violence in Palestinian Authority textbooks. Israel, as a democracy, has legal mechanisms to combat hate speech, and such speech is not institutionalized in the education system in the same way as among Palestinians.
19. We reaffirmed our unwavering support, in accordance with international law and the relevant UN resolutions, to the implementation of the two-State solution, where two democratic and sovereign States, Palestine and Israel, live side by side in peace and security within their secure and recognized borders on the basis of the 1967 lines, including with regard to Jerusalem.
The reference to « 1967 lines » is legally inaccurate. These are the 1949 armistice lines, not recognized international borders. UN Security Council Resolution 242 calls for negotiation to establish « secure and recognized boundaries, » not a return to the 1967 armistice lines. Jerusalem’s status is also a final status issue that must be resolved through bilateral negotiation. Unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state within the 1967 lines with East Jerusalem as capital is a political position that does not respect the Oslo Accords’ negotiation framework.
20. We welcomed Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ commitments on behalf of Palestine expressed in his letter dated June 9th, 2025, including to the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, and the continued rejection of violence and terrorism. We also welcomed President Abbas’ statement that the Palestinian State should be the sole provider of security on its territory, but has no intention to be a militarized State and is ready to work on security arrangements beneficial to all parties, in full respect of its sovereignty and as long as it benefits from international protection.
President Abbas’ commitments are contradicted by facts. The Palestinian Authority continues to implement the « pay-for-slay » program, which pays salaries and allowances to imprisoned terrorists and their families. Terrorism financing is a serious violation of past agreements and commitments to reject violence. The Palestinian Authority’s refusal to intervene in certain West Bank areas against armed groups also contradicts security promises.
21. We reaffirmed the need for the Palestinian Authority to continue implementing its credible reform agenda-with international support, particularly from the EU and the League of Arab States, focusing on good governance, transparency, fiscal sustainability, fight against incitement and hate speeches, service provision, business climate and development.
The necessity for reforms is one thing, but the effectiveness of these reforms is a recurring problem. Reports from the Palestinian Auditor General’s Office and EU agencies have raised serious concerns about corruption and lack of transparency within the Palestinian Authority.
22. We also welcomed President Abbas’ commitment to holding democratic and transparent general and presidential elections throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, within a year, under international auspices, enabling democratic competition between Palestinian actors committed to respect the PLO political platform, its international commitments and the relevant UN resolutions, and the principle of One State, One Government, One Law and One Gun, and allowing for a new generation of elected representatives to take responsibility. Upon invitation by the PA, the EU committed to continued support to the electoral process.
Organizing elections without guarantees that Hamas will not participate, as in 2006, is a major security risk. Hamas’ victory in the 2006 elections led to the forcible takeover of Gaza and a de facto civil war between Palestinian factions.
23. We called on the Israeli leadership to issue a clear public commitment to the Two-State Solution, including a sovereign, and viable Palestinian State, to immediately end violence and incitement against Palestinians, to immediately halt all settlement, land grabs and annexation activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, publicly renounce to any annexation project or settlement policy, and put an end to settlers’ violence, including by implementing UNSC resolution 904 and enacting a legislation to punish and deter violent settlers and their illegal actions.
This paragraph is unilateral and does not mention Palestinian violence and incitement. The settlements issue is complex in international law, and the assertion that they are illegal is contested by Israel. The Fourth Geneva Convention (Article 49) prohibits the transfer of civilian population by an occupying power. Israel maintains that the territory is not « occupied » but disputed and that settlements are legal. Moreover, Security Council resolution 904 is non-binding and emphasizes the need for peace and security on both sides.
24. We called on both sides to pursue efforts for their respective political parties to adhere to the principles of non-violence, mutual recognition and the two-State solution.
This paragraph is once again problematic as it establishes a false equivalence. Israeli political parties operate in a rule of law that, though imperfect, guarantees civil and political rights. In contrast, many Palestinian parties do not recognize Israel’s right to exist, which is a fundamental violation of the principle of non-violence and mutual recognition. Reciprocity is, once again, absent.
25. We reaffirmed our support for the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Taking note that there is no ongoing negotiations between the parties, and that illegal unilateral actions are posing an existential threat to the realization of the independent State of Palestine, we reiterated that recognition and realization of the State of Palestine are an essential and indispensable component of the achievement of the two-State solution, while recalling that recognition is a sovereign decision of each individual State. Full admission of the State of Palestine to the United Nations is an indispensable element of the political solution ending the conflict, which will enable full regional integration.
This paragraph is legally incoherent. State recognition is a sovereign and political act, not an obligation under international law. Admission of a state to the United Nations is governed by Article 4 of the UN Charter, which requires the state to be « peace-loving » and « able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter. » Palestine, due to political division and incitement to violence by its leaders, does not meet these criteria.
26. We committed to mobilizing political and financial support for the Palestinian Authority as it advances its reforms to help it strengthen institutional capacities, implement its reform agenda, and uphold its responsibilities across the Occupied Palestinian Territory. To that aim, we called on more States to commit to an increased financial support, along the EU and other donors, and for the convening, as soon as possible, of an international donors’ meeting.
Mobilizing financial aid is a point of friction. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports have raised concerns about the Palestinian Authority’s lack of accountability in fund management. Financial aid without reform and transparency conditions is counterproductive.
27. We agreed to promote Palestinian economic development, facilitating trade, and enhancing Palestinian private sector competitiveness. We called for the removal of movement and access restrictions and the immediate release of withheld Palestinian tax revenues and committed to the revision of the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations (1994), the establishment of a new framework for clearance revenue transfers leading to Palestinian ownership over taxation, as well as the full integration of Palestine into the International Monetary and Financial System and ensuring sustainable corresponding banking relations for the long-term.
This paragraph contradicts the Paris Accords (1994), which were signed by the Palestinian Authority. Article 2 of Annex V of the Oslo Accords allows Israel to withhold tax revenues for security reasons and in case of agreement violations, such as terrorism financing. Demanding unilateral revision of this agreement is a violation of past commitments. Movement restrictions are legitimate security measures.
28. We stressed that compliance with and respect for the Charter of the United Nations and international law is a cornerstone of peace and security in the region.
This assertion is correct, but its selective application is a problem. Non-compliance with UN resolutions by other Middle Eastern states is often ignored in favor of focusing on Israel’s actions.
29. We committed to protecting peace efforts against potential spoilers who seek to derail the implementation of the two-State solution through illegal unilateral measures and violent actions.
This paragraph omits naming the main « spoilers » of the peace process, namely Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, which have actively sabotaged peace efforts.
30. We reaffirmed our strong opposition to all illegal actions that, on both sides, undermine the viability of the two State-solution, including settlement activities, and expressed our commitment to taking concrete measures, in accordance with international law, and in line with the relevant UN resolutions and the 19 July 2024 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, to help realize the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to counter the illegal settlement policy in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and policies and threats of forcible displacement and annexation.
The reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 2024 advisory opinion is a political assertion, as an advisory opinion is not a binding judgment. The legal status of Israeli settlements is disputed, and the 1979 Israeli Supreme Court ruling in the Elon Moreh case established that settlements can be legal if built on state-owned land and not on private property. The accusation of « forced displacement » is an allegation that must be proven.
31. We called for upholding unchanged the legal and historical Status Quo in the Islamic and Christian Holy Sites in Jerusalem, and we stress the key role of the Hashemite Custodianship in this regard, and support for the role of the Jordan-run Jerusalem Awqaf and Aqsa Affairs Department.
Support for the status quo is desirable, but this paragraph does not mention the numerous violations of the status quo by the Jordanian Waqf, which has often allowed the Temple Mount to be used as a base for riots and attacks against security forces and Jewish worshippers. Ignoring these violations gives a biased picture of the situation.
32. We committed to adopting restrictive measures, against violent extremist settlers and entities and individuals supporting illegal settlements, in accordance with international law.
Targeted sanctions against individuals guilty of violence are legal, but sanctions against « entities » as such may be considered unilateral political pressure. Israel has a legal system to prosecute violent settlers.
33. We committed to adopting targeted measures, in accordance with international law, against entities and individuals acting against the principle of the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, through violence or acts of terrorism, and in breach of international law.
This paragraph is relevant if targeted measures are applied equally, notably against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members, which is not always the case.
34. Regional integration and independent Palestinian Statehood are intertwined objectives. The end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, is imperative for regional peace, stability and integration. Only by ending the war in Gaza, releasing all hostages, ending occupation, rejecting violence and terror, realizing an independent, sovereign and democratic Palestinian State, ending the occupation of all Arab territories and providing solid security guarantees for Israel and Palestine, can normal relations and coexistence among the region’s peoples and States be achieved.
The idea that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the « core » of the Arab-Israeli conflict is outdated by history. The Abraham Accords prove that peace and regional cooperation can develop without prior resolution of this conflict.
35. We agreed to take tangible steps in promoting mutual recognition, peaceful coexistence, and cooperation among all States in the region, linked to irreversible implementation of the two-State solution.
This paragraph links regional peace to the two-state solution, which is contradicted by the facts of the Abraham Accords.
36. We called upon both the Israelis and Palestinians to resume, with international support, supervision and guarantees, negotiations in good faith and with good will to achieve mutually assured peace and stability.
Good faith is an essential condition for any peace process. Palestinian lack of good faith, characterized by refusal to recognize Israel’s existence, terrorism financing, and teaching anti-Jewish hatred, has been a major cause of negotiation failures.
37. We agreed to support, in parallel to the conclusion of a peace agreement between Palestine and Israel, renewed effort on the Syria-Israel and Lebanon-Israel tracks with the aim of achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East, in accordance with international law and the relevant UN resolutions, putting an end to all claims.
Peace with Syria and Lebanon is improbable due to the presence of Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed terrorist organization that has military and political influence over Lebanon, and the instability of the Syrian regime which commits/permits pogroms against its Druze population for example.
38. We committed to preparing the ground for a future « Peace Day, » building on the Arab Peace Initiative, the « European Peace Supporting Package », and other international contributions, which will deliver clear dividends for Palestinians, Israelis, and the region as a whole, including on trade, infrastructure, and energy, and enable regional integration, leading to a regional security architecture that promotes and respects the rights of all peoples and the sovereignty of all States.
This paragraph is a utopian political statement that is not achievable without radical transformation of (terrorist) actors and hostile regimes.
39. In this regard we decided to explore, in the context of the realization of a sovereign Palestinian State, a regional security architecture that could provide security guarantees for all, building on the experience of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), paving the way for a more stable and secure Middle East, as well as a regional and international framework offering appropriate support to resolving the refugee question, while reiterating the right of return.
The analogy with ASEAN or OSCE is fallacious. These organizations are based on respect for the sovereignty of all member states. One of the main obstacles to peace is the reiteration of the « right of return » for refugees, a demand that, if applied, would lead to the end of Israel as a majority Jewish state. This « right » has no basis in customary international law or treaty law.
40. We are determined to ensure that the decisions made at this Conference constitute a turning point where the international community as a whole is mobilized, at the political, economic, financial and security levels, to set in motion a long overdue bright future for the benefit of all States and all peoples.
This rhetorical conclusion, like the rest of the text, omits many necessary conditions for the feasibility of the preceding points.
41. We have decided to entrust the co-Chairs of both the conference and the working groups, including in the context of the Global Alliance for the implementation of the two-State solution, to serve as an international mechanism for the follow-up of the objectives of this Conference and the commitments made therein. We agreed to mobilize the international community at leaders’ level around these commitments on the sidelines of the 80th United Nations General Assembly in September 2025.
As previously, this organizational commitment omits all necessary conditions – whether moral, border-related, or legal – for the feasibility of the preceding points.
42. This Declaration and its annex reflect the outcome of the eight working groups convened as part of the Conference, outlining a comprehensive and actionable framework for the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine and the implementation of the two-State solution. These outcomes reflect proposals across the political, security, humanitarian, economic, legal, and strategic narrative dimensions, and constitute a concrete time-bound action plan to guide international engagement and implementation, operational coordination, and follow-up efforts towards the implementation of the Two-State solution and full regional integration./.
The declaration is obsolete due to weak premises and lack of cooperation from terrorist parties or the Palestinian Authority. Its legal and historical foundations are contestable, without even addressing questions of morality and conditions for its realization.